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W
hen a country or 
a community
discovers oil in
their subsoil or off
their coast, should
they rejoice or mourn? Should citizens be
thrilled or worried when their
governments receive fiscal windfalls? It
might seem that the answers to these
questions are obvious: how could finding
an abundance of natural resources or
stumbling on greater resources for the
government to spend in the community
be anything other than wonderful news?
Yet economists are increasingly
sceptical and many of them openly
entertain the seemingly paradoxical notion
that resources and windfalls may actually
be bad news. In fact, some go so far as to
speak of the ‘curse of natural resources’.
Before dismissing this as yet another
instance of the economics profession’s
disconnection from the real world,
consider the following list: Angola, Congo,
Nigeria, Venezuela and the Middle East.
What these places have in common is an
abundance of natural resources coupled
with varying degrees of abject poverty,
state failure and civil war, rampant
corruption and political repression.
Think also of the many anecdotes
linking foreign aid to dependency and
corruption. It is true that a few countries
seem to have managed their natural
resources fairly well – Norway is the oft-
cited example. But overall the general
impression is certainly not one of
resources being an undisguised blessing.
The problem with drawing conclusions
from comparisons of resource-rich
countries with resource-poor countries is
that many other differences can give the
appearance of a causal relation where in
fact there is none. So while it is true that
the Middle East grows (typically) slowly
and has lots of oil, the region also differs
from the rest of the world in a myriad
other social, cultural and institutional
dimensions. We cannot be certain that oil
– as opposed to one or more of these
other characteristics – is the main cause of
low growth. 
Another problem with cross-country
comparisons is that resource abundance
tends to be measured by flows of natural-
resource exports (often as a share of GDP
or total exports). But perhaps poor
countries are dependent on resource
exports because they are poor rather than
being poor because they are dependent
on resource exports. 
Our research attempts to bypass these
difficulties in interpreting cross-country
comparisons by looking at Brazilian
municipalities, which are administrative
units similar in size to the UK’s counties.
Oil endowments, and hence oil
production, vary widely across
municipalities, and we show that oil
output is not correlated (conditional on a
few geographical controls) with other
municipal characteristics.
In other words, oil-rich municipalities
differ from oil-poor municipalities only
because the former have oil and the latter
do not. This makes it possible to ask
Brazil has recently discovered huge new oilfields
off its coast – but will these natural resources be 
a blessing or a curse? Francesco Caselli and 
Guy Michaels investigate whether it has 
been the Brazilian people or their locally elected
representatives who have benefited most from
past oil windfalls.
A resource curse?
The impact of oil windfalls
on living standards in Brazil
Brazilian oil
windfalls
translate 
into little
improvement 
in public goods
provision or
people’s living
standards
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whether oil has positive or negative effects
on other market activities. Furthermore,
oil-producing municipalities are entitled to
royalties, so we can investigate the
consequences of an oil-related revenue
windfall for the local government.
We begin by investigating the effects
of oil on other market activities, and find
that these are small. In particular, if a
Brazilian municipality generates one unit
of the national currency (the real) of 
extra value added from oil, this translates
into roughly one real of extra aggregate
GDP. This indicates that, to a first
approximation, oil production has no
effects, either negative or positive, on
non-oil activities.
We do find some small changes in the
composition of non-oil GDP when the oil
Municipal revenues
from oil are being
spent – but local
communities are not
seeing the benefits
flock to oil-rich communities reinforces our
message that oil abundance has not been
viewed as particularly beneficial.
Our finding that oil windfalls translate
into little improvement in the provision of
public goods or the population’s living
standards raises a key question: where are
the oil revenues going? As a way of
addressing this question, we put together
a few pieces of tentative evidence:
 First, we find that oil revenues increase
the size of municipal workers’ houses
(but not the size of other residents’
houses).
 Second, Brazil’s news agency is more
likely to carry news items mentioning
the mayor and alleged embezzlement,
fraud or corruption in municipalities
with very high levels of oil output 
(on an absolute, though not per 
capita, basis).
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is located onshore: the
manufacturing sector shrinks
and the service sector
expands. (These effects
are probably due to
an expansion of
services to oil
operations and oil
workers.) But
offshore oil has little
impact on non-oil GDP or
on its composition.
We turn next to the revenue windfall.
We confirm that municipal revenues
increase significantly with oil production,
and that oil royalties account for the bulk
of this increase. This makes it clear that
royalty payments are not undone by
offsetting changes in other transfers from
the state or federal governments (or by tax
cuts) – in fact, they are somewhat
reinforced.
The increase in municipal revenues
arising from oil is matched by a
corresponding increase in reported
municipal expenditures. Municipalities that
receive oil windfalls report significant
increases in spending on a variety of
goods and services, such as housing and
urban infrastructure, education, health,
transport and transfers to households.
Given the significant expansion in
reported spending, we might expect
sizable improvements in living standards
for the local population. We therefore
look at measures of housing quality and
quantity, the supply of educational and
health inputs, road infrastructure and
welfare receipts.
The results paint a complex picture,
with no apparent changes in some areas,
small improvements in others and a small
worsening in yet others. On balance,
however, the data appear to suggest that
the actual flow of goods, services and
transfers to the population is not quite
commensurate with the reported spending
increases stemming from the windfall. This
shortfall we dub ‘missing money’.
To confirm that the windfall does not
trickle down to the population through
other channels, we look at household
income and find only minimal
improvements. We also show that oil-rich
municipalities did not experience a
differential increase in population. This
implies that our results are not driven by a
dilution of the benefits of oil abundance.
Furthermore, the fact that people do not
 Third, federal police operations are
more likely to occur in municipalities
with very high levels of oil output
(again in absolute terms).
 And finally, we document anecdotal
evidence of alleged scandals involving
mayors in several of the largest 
oil-producing municipalities, some 
of which also involve large sums 
of money.
How could senior municipal workers 
have thought that they could ‘get away’
with large-scale alleged theft in a country
where local elections are held regularly?
As a partial answer, we note that a survey
in the largest oil-producing municipality
found considerable ignorance among
residents about the scale of the municipal
oil windfall. 
How much can we generalise 
from our findings to other settings? 
Oil royalties
seem to be
somehow more
‘stealable’ than
other types of
revenues
revenues from oil operations directly to
local governments, at least if the officials
are not properly monitored and
accountable. For Brazil, this may be an
especially important consideration as the
system of property rights and royalties will
probably be overhauled in response to the
recent discovery of huge new offshore
oilfields.
Indeed, the issue is clearly of political
relevance, with several major federal
legislative proposals to reform the royalty
system currently pending. Interestingly,
most proposals tend to reduce both the
share of royalties going to local
governments and the discretion that these
governments have in using the revenues.
In the summer of 2009, the federal
government issued its own proposals for
the property rights regime of the newly
discovered ‘pre-salt’ giant oilfields.
More generally, our results may inform
the debate about increasing transparency
requirements both in poor, resource-
abundant countries and in countries that
receive aid. In particular, it is increasingly
common for conditionality-based
programmes to feature stringent reporting
requirements from multinational oil
companies and recipient governments.
Our results suggest that accounting
transparency per se may be insufficient.
Reporting schemes should document 
the actual effective disbursement of 
sums, and not merely their recording on
balance sheets.
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This article summarises ‘Do Oil Windfalls
Improve Living Standards? Evidence from
Brazil’ by Francesco Caselli and Guy
Michaels, CEP Discussion Paper No. 960
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0960.pdf).
Francesco Caselli is a professor of
economics at LSE and director of CEP’s
research programme on macroeconomics.
Guy Michaels is a lecturer in economics at
LSE and a research associate in CEP’s labour
markets programme.
We acknowledge that what might be 
true for Brazil need not apply to other
countries. More importantly, there are a
number of prominent explanations for the
‘resource curse’ that might only operate at
the national level.
For example, some argue that resource
abundance leads to an overvalued nominal
exchange rate, with deleterious
consequences for competitiveness.
Naturally, this cannot show up across
municipalities, which do not print their
own currencies. Similarly, our analysis
cannot test the hypothesis that resource
abundance is a cause of political violence
and civil war.
But our results do lend some credence
to the view that oil royalties are somehow
more ‘stealable’ than other types of
revenues. When we look at the usage and
effects of municipal revenues coming from
other sources, we find significant
differences relative to revenue coming
from oil, and the puzzle of ‘missing
money’ is less severe.
This may be because citizens
themselves are more tolerant of
embezzlement when the money does not
come from tax revenues. Or it may be
because they have less accurate
information on the amounts flowing to
the government in the form of oil
royalties. We cannot explore these
possibilities with our data.
But our findings do suggest that it
may be somewhat unwise to channel
Oil revenues should not 
be channelled directly to
local governments if officials
are not properly monitored
and accountable
